The Hazards of Genetically Engineered Foods by Margulis, Charles
The Hazards of Genetically
Engineered Foods
“Genetically Modified Foods: Breeding
Uncertainty” (Schmidt 2005) overlooked
many serious concerns about the environmen-
tal and health risks of this new technology.
Potential problems from antibiotic-resistant
genes used in gene-altered crops, risks from
unintended effects of the genetic engineering
process, the increases in pesticide use stem-
ming from widespread planting of gene-
spliced varieties—these and several other
concerns were ignored or hardly mentioned
in the lengthy article. Additional information
on this topic is available from the Center for
Food Safety (CFS 2000, 2004).
Instead, Schmidt’s article states that “GM
agriculture is here to stay” (Schmidt 2005)
and gives readers the false impression that
safety and regulatory issues have been ade-
quately addressed by industry and govern-
ment. Nothing could be further from the
truth. For example, regarding the risk of
allergies from gene-altered foods, Schmidt
stated that biotech companies avoid allergy
problems by avoiding genes from the most
common allergens. However, in an editorial
in the New England Journal of Medicine,
Nestle (1996) pointed out that this approach
leaves many uncertainties:
Most biotechnology companies use microorgan-
isms rather than food plants as gene donors, even
though the allergenic potential of these newly
introduced microbial proteins is uncertain, unpre-
dictable, and untestable …. Because FDA require-
ments do not apply to foods that are rarely
allergenic or to donor organisms of unknown
allergenicity, the policy would appear to favor
industry over consumer protection.
Schmidt (2005) went on to assert that
after a 1993 study alerted them to the possibil-
ity of introducing allergens, biotech companies
developed better screens and learned to aban-
don varieties that could not be deemed aller-
gen-free. Far from abandoning a risky new
variety 5 years after this study, industry mar-
keted a new genetically engineered corn vari-
ety, despite warning signs that it might trigger
allergies in people. Although it was registered
only for nonfood uses, the altered corn, called
StarLink, contaminated hundreds of food
products sold in supermarkets nationwide
and cost industry and farmers hundreds of
millions of dollars to clean up. Aventis paid
$110 million to compensate farmers for lost
markets due to StarLink contamination, and
analysts estimated that the company spent an
additional $500 million to pay for losses to
farmers, food processors, and grain handlers
(Harl 2003; Jacobs 2003). Despite this and
other troubling contamination episodes, such
as those described by Gillis (2002), Nichols
(2002), and Greenpeace (2005), the biotech
industry continues to grow open fields of
genetically engineered pharmaceutical crops
(crops altered to produce experimental drugs
or industrial proteins) that have never been
assessed for their allergenic potential or other
food safety issues.
Schmidt also ignored scientific concerns
about the Food and Drug Administration’s
(FDA) approach to gene-altered foods.
Millstone et al. (1999) criticized the idea of
“substantial equivalence” that the FDA uses
to evaluate genetically engineered foods, call-
ing the concept “inherently anti-scientific
because it was created to provide an excuse
for not requiring biochemical and toxicologi-
cal tests.” In a letter published in Nature
Biotechnology, Schenkelaars (2002) also
derided the concept and noted that more
appropriate testing methods would “systemat-
ically detect unintended changes in the com-
position of GM crops … as such changes may
be of toxicological, immunological, or nutri-
tional concern.” A lawsuit the CFS brought
against the FDA exposed documents from
top level scientists throughout the agency,
who warned that the FDA’s equivalence-
based policy was inadequate to protect against
these kinds of unintended changes in gene-
altered food (Alliance for Biointegrity 2004).
The purported benefits of gene-modified
varieties should be examined against other
agricultural approaches that have shown
documented gains for food production and
the environment. Schmidt (2005) cited a
study of recent field trials of gene-altered rice
in China that looked at a few dozen farms
(Huang 2005). However, in one of the
largest-ever studies of commercial rice grow-
ing, researchers found that thousands of
Chinese farmers using agroecologic tech-
niques saw yield increases of 89% while
completely eliminating some of their most
common pesticides (Zhu 2000). Other
large-scale projects have shown that thou-
sands of Chinese farmers using ecologic
techniques significantly reduced pesticide
use without expensive, patented gene-modi-
fied seeds (Yanqing 2002).
Finally, Schmidt (2005) claimed he
could get no answer to his questions about
industry’s plans for protecting their patented
seeds in the developing world. However,
that answer came in 1998, when family farm
advocates exposed the biotech industry’s
“terminator genes” that instill seed sterility in
gene-altered varieties (Rural Advancement
Foundation International 1998). This termi-
nator technology was developed to ensure
that farmers in the developing world could
not reuse genetically engineered seed (ETC
Group 2002). Advocates have uncovered over
two dozen similar industry patents for seed
sterility engineering (Rural Advancement
Foundation International 1999). This tech-
nology threatens the lives of over 1.4 billion
people who rely on saved seed for their daily
nutritional needs, yet it is being brought to
market by a genetic engineering industry that
perversely promises to “feed the world.”
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Credibility of Scientists:
Industry versus Public
Interest
In their article “Assessing the Reliability and
Credibility of Industry Science and
Scientists,” Barrow and Conrad (2006)
demonstrated a sophisticated understanding
of the nuances of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (1972). They accurately
pointed out that the act draws a distinction
between conflicts of interest, which hinge
on financial self-interest, and bias, which
may exist for a host of reasons including
research funding sources.
Alas, in their haste to condemn public
interest groups who wish the government
would adhere to the letter and spirit of that
law, Barrow and Conrad (2006) incorrectly
characterized objections by the Center for
Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) and the
Environmenal Working Group (EWG) to
two scientists nominated in December 2004
to sit on a U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) advisory panel evaluating the
risk of perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA)
(EWG and CSPI 2004). This misrepresenta-
tion may have helped prove their thesis, but
it in no way reflects what is actually going on
at the U.S. EPA, the National Academies,
and other agencies that routinely form
advisory panels. 
Barrow and Conrad (2006) suggested
that the CSPI and the EWG challenged
two scientists because they were “funded by
industry.” In fact, there were nine industry-
funded scientists listed as potential candi-
dates for this panel. The two scientists
singled out by the CSPI and the EWG cur-
rently or previously worked for DuPont or
3M, which have a direct financial stake in
the outcome of the committee’s delibera-
tions (EWG and CSPI 2004). Thus, these
scientists were covered by the conflict of
interest standard, not the bias standard.
The Federal Advisory Committee Act
(1972) states that scientists with conflicts of
interest cannot serve on federal advisory
committees unless their expertise cannot be
recruited elsewhere. The EWG and CSPI
(2004) suggested that there were other sci-
entists available with the requisite expertise.
The U.S. EPA must have agreed with this
analysis, because the final panel announced
in February 2005 (U.S. EPA 2005) did
not include either scientist, although it
did include two others with prior industry
ties to whom the groups did not object.
By contrast, only one scientist on the
panel can be said to be “environmental”
in orientation.
Barrow and Conrad (2006) saw this
panel as proof that public interest and envi-
ronmental groups are seeking to tilt the
playing field against industry. In fact, indus-
try-funded scientists often play a dominant
role on committees established under the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (1972).
And, as in the PFOA panel case, those with
financial support from industry usually out-
number by a two- or three-to-one margin
those whose writings suggest they may be
sympathetic to environmental or consumer
interests (CSPI, in press).
Barrow and Conrad (2006) concluded
that industry scientists should be allowed to
serve on advisory panels because “they can
provide unique knowledge and insight con-
cerning the chemical in question.” No
doubt such scientists should be encouraged
to present their data to a panel evaluating
the health risks of a particular chemical.
However, if they work full- or part-time for
a company that makes, uses, or competes
against the chemical, then allowing those
scientists to sit on the panel would be the
equivalent of allowing one side in a court
case to name the jurors. 
The author declares he has no competing
financial interests.
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Credibility of Scientists:
Conflict of Interest and Bias
In their commentary, Barrow and Conrad
(2006), both employed by the chemical
industry, argued that industry-funded science
and scientists are high quality and unbiased,
and this is enforced through policies and
practices such as disclosure of funding
sources in scientific journals, guidelines for
Good Laboratory Practices, peer review, the
scientific process of independent repeatabil-
ity, various federal laws, and the prospect of
tort liability. Ironically, these same mecha-
nisms have publicly revealed the often suc-
cessful efforts by industry to weaken the
regulation of their products. 
The current checks and balances cited
by Barrow and Conrad (2006) are not
always effective guards against biased or
even bad science. Numerous examples of
biased industry science have been reported
in the scientific literature: 
• In an article co-authored by U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) scientists,
Dearfield et al. (1993) compared the results
from registrant-submitted mutagenicity
studies to the U.S. EPA Office of Pesticide
Programs with those from the published
literature. The authors reported a selection
bias, in which registrant-submitted studies
on atrazine mutagenicity were all negative
(no mutagenic activity), whereas over a
dozen studies in the published literature
reported mutagenic activity. 
• In an analysis of studies submitted to the
U.S. EPA on the effects of atrazine on
frog reproductive development, Hayes
(2004) reported that financial sponsorship
was a strong predictor of study outcome
(p = 0.009). Funding sources varied for
studies reporting adverse effects (including
government and industry funding),
whereas all of the studies that failed to
detect adverse effects were funded by the
manufacturer of atrazine. 
• In an analysis of 115 published studies on
low-dose effects of the plastics-component
bisphenol A, vom Saal and Hughes (2005)
reported that > 90% of government-
funded studies found significant low-dose
effects, whereas none of the industry-
funded studies did. More specifically, the
authors found that
Some industry-funded studies have ignored the
results of positive controls, and many studies
reporting no significant effects used a strain of
rat that is inappropriate for the study of estro-
genic responses. (vom Saal and Hughes 2005) 
• Studies of documents from the tobacco
industry archives have revealed evidence of
concerted industry efforts to obscure the
contribution of secondhand smoke and
other environmental toxics to disease
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Correspondencethrough the development of their own
version of “good epidemiological prac-
tices” and “sound science” (Ong and
Glantz 2001).
As Barrow and Conrad (2006) pointed
out, federal scientific advisory committees
and the National Academies want to include
relevant experts, and therefore may appoint
industry experts despite direct financial con-
flicts. As a solution, the International Agency
for Research on Cancer (IARC) sometimes
invites financially conflicted experts to speak
to the committee but bars them from draft-
ing documents or voting on evaluations
(Cogliano et al. 2004). Prompt implementa-
tion of strict conflict guidelines (similar to
those adopted by IARC) by the U.S. govern-
ment and the National Academies should be
a high priority. An editorial in The Lancet
(2002) warned, 
Members of expert panels need to be impartial
and credible, and free of partisan conflicts of
interest, especially in industry links or in right-
wing or religious ideology.
Barrow and Conrad (2006) argued that I
am biased because my work on scientific
integrity is funded by a private foundation.
However, there is no financial stake in the
regulation of toxics for myself, my employer,
or my funders. Moreover, the funders do not
review or comment on my prepublication
work or influence my work product in any
way. I consistently acknowledge a bias
toward ensuring that regulations of toxic
chemicals are as health protective as feasi-
ble, consistent with the U.S. EPA’s stated
goal—“to protect human health and the
environment” (U.S. EPA 2005).
The author is employed by an environmental
nonprofit organization with an interest in
ensuring that regulations of toxic chemicals are
as health protective as feasible.
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Credibility of Scientists:
Barrow and Conrad Respond
We appreciate Goozner’s compliment that
our commentary (Barrow and Conrad
2006) demonstrates “a sophisticated under-
standing of the nuances of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act.” We wish we
could take credit for “accurately point[ing]
out that the act draws a distinction
between conflicts of interest … and bias,”
except that it does not—as we noted; fed-
eral rules under the Ethics in Government
Act (1978) make the distinction. We did
not, however, incorrectly misrepresent the
Center for Science in the Public Interest’s
(CSPI) basis for opposing the nominations
of two scientists to sit on a U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) panel.
We said that the CSPI opposed them
because they were “funded by industry”
(Barrow and Conrad 2006). Goozner char-
acterizes this statement as implying that the
scientists were only biased, whereas in his
view the scientists really “were covered by
the conflict of interest standard” because
they “currently or previously worked for
DuPont.” Alas, the scientists did not have a
conflict of interest under the federal stan-
dard, which only applies to current
employment or ownership (Office of
Government Ethics 1997). The CSPI’s
own press release makes clear that one of
the two scientists, an academic, “four years
ago conducted 3M’s $1.3-million study of
… PFOA,” and that the other scientist,
“[p]rior to working for [his current
employer], spent many years working for
DuPont ….” (CSPI 2004). Neither scien-
tist worked for DuPont, or had a conflict
of interest under federal rules, when he was
being considered for the U.S. EPA panel. 
In her letter, Sass cites four studies,
involving three politically controversial
chemicals, purporting to show that industry-
funded research is more likely to find no
adverse effects from the chemical studied,
whereas government-funded studies are
more likely to detect such effects. The
authors of one of those studies at least rec-
ognized that these findings have two plausi-
ble interpretations: either “industry-funded
scientists [are] under real or perceived pres-
sure to find or publish only data suggesting
negative outcomes,” or “government-
funded scientists [are] under real or per-
ceived pressure to find or publish only data
suggesting adverse outcomes …” (vom Saal
and Hughes 2005). Pielke (2005) observed
that such obsessive focus on funding leads
journalists in particular to conclude that
“research findings are ‘in the eye of the
beholder,’” a result he believes is “damaging
to science and its role in policy.”
Sass urges the U.S. government and the
National Academies to adopt more strin-
gent conflict of interest guidelines, quoting
a Lancet (2002) editorial that actually
addressed manipulation of scientific panels
by politicians. In an earlier commentary,
more to the point, the editor of The Lancet
(Horton 1997) argued that financial con-
flicts “may not be [more] influential” than
biases and that “interpretations of scientific
data will always be refracted through the
experiences and biases of the authors.” He
contended that disqualifying researchers
from writing editorials or reviews because
of their “associations” with industry “may
harm free discussion in science.” Horton
(1997) concluded that “[t]he only way to
minimize bias among interpretations is to
allow maximum dialogue from all parties,
irrespective of their interests.” Making gov-
ernment conflict or bias rules more exclu-
sionary will not serve that end.
C.B. is employed by The Dow Chemical
Company. J.C. is employed by the American
Chemistry Council, a trade association that repre-
sents chemical manufacturers.
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Methylmercury, Amalgams,
and Children’s Health 
In their excellent article, Björnberg et al.
(2005) stated that exposure to methyl-
mercury in humans occurs primarily
through fish consumption. We would like
to make one observation about the sources
of potential exposure to methylmercury in
the general population. 
We were surprised that Björnberg et al.
(2005) failed to mention saliva as a plausi-
ble biologic source of methylmercury in
individuals who have mercury dental fill-
ings. Leistevuo et al. (2001) found a corre-
lation between the total amalgam surfaces
and organic mercury—presumably as
methylmercury (CH3Hg+)—in saliva. 
Previous studies have reported that
mouth air levels of elemental mercury (Hg0)
significantly correlate with the number of
occlusal surfaces (Lorscheider et al. 1995;
Clarkson 2002). Hence, when mercury
vapor (Hg0) is released from amalgams and
dissolved into the saliva, it exists mainly as
Hg0 and partly as inorganic divalent mer-
cury (Hg2+). 
Consistent with this background, saliva
has high levels of inorganic mercury associ-
ated with the total number of amalgam sur-
faces, which markedly increased during
mastication and bruxism. In approximately
270 individuals with amalgams, we used
inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrom-
etry to measure a wide range of possible val-
ues of total mercury in saliva. Mercury
levels ranged from the limit of detection
[LOD; 0.1 µg/L] to 780 µg/L in both sali-
vary baseline flow rate in unstimulated con-
dition and in a post–chewing-gum test
(Guzzi et al. 2005). 
Trace amounts of elemental and inor-
ganic mercury from saliva are taken up by
oral bacteria, which in turn release methyl-
mercury as their by-product. Heintze et al.
(1983) and Lyttle et al. (1993) reported
direct evidence that organic mercury in saliva
is due to the transformation of bacteria. As
shown in our article (Pigatto et al. 2005), the
proximate cause of mercury alkylation in oral
microbial communities—which occurs in
dental plaque—appears to be associated with
the presence of some bacteria. 
Furthermore, our ongoing investigation
seems to support the work of Leistevuo
et al. (2001), suggesting evidence that sub-
jects with dental amalgams have shown
higher levels of methylmercury compared
with controls (Guzzi et al. 2005).
Once ingested in the gastrointestinal
tract, the methylmercury in saliva is there-
fore nearly all absorbed (> 95%), as is
methylmercury in fish. Leistevuo et al.
(2001) reported that the levels of methyl-
mercury in saliva ranged from 0 to 174
nmol/L (0–37.523–µg/L), with a mean
methylmercury level estimate of 14.0
nmol/L (3.019–µg/L). (Leistevuo et al.
2001). Assuming that daily adult salivary
secretion is at least 800 mL, speciation
analyses indicate that exposure to methyl-
mercury through ingestion—apparently
derived from oral bacteria biomethylation
of inorganic mercury—is about 2–3 µg/day
(Leistevuo et al. 2001). Perhaps Björnberg
et al. (2005) did not deem this exposure
significant?
Considering that the relevant feature of
methylmercury in humans is accumulation
in both adult and fetal brain, it is quite clear
that, over time, the extensive exposure to
methylmercury associated with dental amal-
gams should be taken into account. We
believe that organic mercury found in saliva
may indeed represent a potential nondietary
source of methylmercury. 
The authors declare they have no competing
financial interests.
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Methylmercury, Amalgams,
and Children’s Health:
Björnberg et al. Respond
We acknowledge the points raised by Guzzi
et al. regarding our recent publication on the
transport of methylmercury and inorganic
mercury to the fetus and breast-fed infant
(Björnberg et al. 2005). The issue is whether
the methylation of inorganic mercury from
dental amalgam is of sufficient size to signifi-
cantly contribute to the exposure to organic
mercury. 
Demethylation of methylmercury into
inorganic mercury is the key step in the
excretion process of methylmercury. This
process occurs through microbial activity
within the intestine. To a limited extent
demethylation may also take place in the
blood (Berglund et al. 2005). The kinetics of
mercury in the human body may also
include methylation of inorganic mercury,
but the present knowledge of this process is
rather limited. Based on findings from
in vitro studies (Heintze et al. 1983; Lyttle
et al. 1993), Guzzi et al. postulate that
organic mercury in saliva is due to bacterial
transformation in the oral cavity. It is of
course of toxicologic interest to further inves-
tigate the biotransformation of mercury in
both directions. 
Inorganic mercury has been shown to
accumulate in exocrine glands, and saliva is
also one excretion pathway for inorganic mer-
cury (Joselow 1968). It should be pointed out
that the saliva samples used by Leistevuo et al.
(2001), to which Guzzi et al. refer, consist of
paraffin-stimulated whole saliva. Therefore it
is not possible to ascertain to what extent the
sample reflects excreted mercury from the
central circulation (which could originate
from both inorganic mercury and methyl-
mercury exposure) or mercury derived
directly from the fillings in the oral cavity. 
In the study by Leistevuo et al. (2001),
15–18% of total mercury in saliva (5–12.5
nmol/L) was organic in a group of subjects
with amalgam fillings. These subjects had,
on average, 22 amalgam-filled surfaces
(range, 2–51). In the non-amalgam group,
the organic mercury was 2–5 nmol/L. As cal-
culated by Guzzi et al., the subjects with
amalgam would ingest about 2–3 µg/day of
methylmercury derived from oral bacteria
biomethylation of inorganic mercury. 
Our study group of pregnant women
(Björnberg et al. 2005) was exposed to low
levels of both methylmercury and inorganicmercury, as reflected in the low concentra-
tions found in blood. They consumed small
amounts of fish and had few amalgam fill-
ings, on average five amalgam-filled surfaces
(range, 0–24). Therefore, the exposure to
methylmercury possible originating from
bacterial methylation of inorganic mercury
in the oral cavity is far lower than that
reported by Leistevuo et al. (2001). 
It should also be pointed out that a
meal of fish (200 g) containing 500 µg/kg
methylmercury would result in the inges-
tion of 100 µg methylmercury. Also, con-
sumption of fish with more moderate levels
(50 µg/kg) would give rise to significant
exposure (10 µg methylmercury). 
Even though a small exposure to methyl-
mercury may occur from bacterial methylation
of inorganic mercury in the oral cavity, this
exposure would be far lower than methylmer-
cury exposure via fish consumption. 
The authors declare they have no competing
financial interests.
Karolin Ask Björnberg and Marie Vahter
Institute of Environmental Medicine
Karolinska Institutet
Stockholm, Sweden
Gunilla Sandborgh Englund
Institute of Odontology
Karolinska Institutet
Huddinge, Sweden
E-mail: Gunilla.Sandborgh@ki.se
REFERENCES
Berglund M, Lind B, Björnberg KA, Palm B, Einarsson Ö,
Vahter M. 2005. Inter-individual variations of human mer-
cury exposure biomarkers: a cross-sectional assess-
ment. Environ Health 4:20; doi:10.1186/1476-069X-4-20
[Online 3 October 2005].
Björnberg KA, Vahter M, Berglund B, Niklasson B, Blennow M,
Sandborgh-Englund G. 2005. Transport of methylmercury
and inorganic mercury to the fetus and breast-fed infant.
Environ Health Perspect 113:1381–1385.
Heintze U, Edwardsson S, Derand T, Birkhed D. 1983.
Methylation of mercury from dental amalgam and mer-
curic chloride by oral streptococci in vitro. Scand J Dent
Res 91:150–152. 
Joselow MJ, Ruiz R, Goldwater LJ. 1968. Absorption and
excretion of mercury in man. XIV. Salivary excretion and
its relationship to blood and urine mercury. Arch Environ
Health 17:35–38.
Leistevuo J, Leistevuo T, Helenius H, Pyy L, Osterblad M,
Huovinen P, et al. 2001. Dental amalgam fillings and the
amount of organic mercury in human saliva. Caries Res
35:163–166.
Lyttle HA, Bowden GH. 1993. The level of mercury in human
dental plaque and interaction in vitro between biofilm of
Streptococcus mutans and dental amalgam. J Dental Res
72:1320–1324. 
Smoking in Pregnancy
Zanardo et al. (2005) raise an interesting
issue in their article, namely, the influence
of smoking on immunologic parameters and
especially on the composition of human
breast milk. The findings deserve notice and
further investigation.
Because of the importance of the find-
ings, the errors and inconsistencies in the
article (Zanardo et al. 2005) should be cor-
rected. The first inconsistency is related to
the number of participants: In the “Materials
and Methods,” Zanardo et al. (2005) gave
two different numbers: 
Of the 1,217 eligible participants, 25 of 26 self-
identified as smokers (≥ 5 cigarettes per day
through pregnancy until last trimester) were
recruited for study participation. One was
excluded from the final analysis because of mater-
nal fever. Control participants included consecu-
tive women without history of smoking and
matched a smoking participant on the basis of
overall inclusion criteria.
We grouped human milk samples into third
postpartum day smoker and nonsmoker mother
groups, with 42 and 40 samples per group,
respectively, and into 10th postpartum day
smoker and nonsmoker mother groups, with 42
and 40 samples per group, respectively. 
The latter numbers (42 and 40) are also
repeated in the first sentence of “Results”
and in Table 1. Also in Table 1 the average
number of cigarettes smoked per day by the
42 smokers is given as 3.2 ± 0.7 (mean ±
SD). This is inconsistent with their selec-
tion criterion of “≥ 5 cigarettes per day.”
Table 1 also provides information on birth
weight, gestational age, and APGAR score. As
expected from numerous previous studies, the
children of the smokers scored lower in all
these respects. Under “statistical analysis” the
authors write that they “used the Student t-test
for the analysis of [these] data.” To apply the
Student t-test for the birth weight data seems a
sensible choice. When doing this using the fig-
ures provided in Table 1, the difference of the
birth weight between the children of smokers
and nonsmokers is clearly highly significant
(t = 9.45). In the “Results,” Zanardo et al.
(2005) stated erroneously that “the birth
weight of the newborn infants of smoker
mothers was not significantly lower.”
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Editor’s note: In accordance with journal
policy, Zanardo et al. were asked whether they
wanted to respond to this letter, but they chose
not to do so.
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